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Township-village enterprises (TVEs) were a major engine of China’s rapid rural industrialization in the 
past three decades. TVEs also played a key role in fostering entrepreneurship and served as a major 
stepping-stone for institutional changes when legal protections of private property rights were not in place 
and the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were slow to react to changing market demand. As private 
ownership was gradually recognized legally, TVEs lost their edge in competing with private firms. In the 
past two decades, industrial clusters with a concentration of private entrepreneurial firms coordinated by 
local governments have emerged rapidly in many areas. The structures of such firms as TVEs and the 
subsequent clustering modes of production are an outcome of interaction with other local and macro 
environments. As the environment changes, a firm’s organization and organizational structure may 
change as well.  




1.  INTRODUCTION 
Township-village enterprises (TVEs), rural “collectively owned” entrepreneurial firms, had a great impact 
on the rise of China in the past three decades. A large body of literature has shown that TVEs were a 
major engine of China’s rapid rural industrialization. TVEs also played a key role in fostering 
entrepreneurship and served as a major stepping-stone for institutional changes when legal protections of 
private property rights were not in place and the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were slow to react to 
changing market demand (Weitzman and Xu 1994; Che and Qian 1998; Mukherjee and Zhang 2007).
  
A basic feature of TVEs is the deep involvement of local governments, particularly township 
governments.
1
                                                       
1 A township is the lowest administrative level of government. A township government was called a commune government 
before 1984. A typical township has a population between 30,000 and 150,000. 
 At the same time, the institution of the TVE is heterogeneous. The course of TVE 
development did not follow a one-size-fits-all blueprint. Instead, various models of the TVE emerged and 
evolved in adaptation to local comparative advantage and constraints. Well-known models include the 
southern Jiangsu (Sunan) model, the Wenzhou model in Zhejiang province, and the Guangdong model. 
Despite differences in details, TVEs share the following key characteristics: all were led by entrepreneurs; 
all had vaguely defined ownership at the incipient stage, reflecting certain institutional constraints 
(Weitzman and Xu 1994; Li 1996); and all had an intimate relationship with local governments (Qian and 
Xu 1993; Chang and Wang 1994; Che and Qian 1998).  
As private ownership was gradually recognized legally, TVEs lost their edge in competing with 
private firms. After reaching its peak in the mid-1990s, the sector phased out quickly. Concurrent with the 
decline of TVEs was the rise of private entrepreneurship firms. In addition to the TVEs’ legacies of 
breeding entrepreneurship and spreading technology know-how, there is a common key factor that was 
responsible for the spectacular development of the TVEs and, later, of private firms—the local 
governments. In fact, many of the entrepreneurship firms’ origins can be traced to TVEs as many early 
private firms were spun off from TVEs.  
In the past two decades, industrial clusters with a concentration of private entrepreneurial firms 
coordinated by local governments have emerged rapidly in vast rural areas in coastal provinces. In the 
clusters, production processes, which are usually integrated within a single firm in developed countries, 
are segmented into many small “firms,” each of them narrowly specialized in one process. Designers, 
suppliers, manufacturers, and merchants have organized themselves into a dynamic and entrepreneurial 
network. Instead of vertical integration, firms in industrial clusters experience a vertical division of labor. 
This feature of increasing the division of labor fundamentally alters ownership, operation, coordination, 
finance, and production. For example, with the division of labor, capital barriers to entry have been 
lowered, enabling more farmers with entrepreneurial talents to participate in the production process. 
Although a deepening division of labor might incur a higher coordination cost among different parties 
involved in the transactions, the benefits of industrial clusters might make this entrepreneurial network 
more efficient than alternative arrangements.  
Unlike the TVEs, the small “firms” are privately owned. Similar to the TVE arrangement, local 
governments, particularly the township governments, have played a central role in facilitating 
development. A very interesting point here is that many of the functions of local government were 
transformed after the fall of the TVEs from direct control and management of TVEs to coordination and 
provision of public goods essential for clustered private firms. We will discuss the trade-offs posed by 
these institutional arrangements.  
The following section discusses the origin and rise of TVEs. Section 3 presents the fall of TVEs 
and the rise of private firms. Section 4 concludes.   
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2.  THE ORIGIN AND RISE OF TVES 
Origin of TVEs 
Soon after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese government transplanted the 
Soviet model of central planning at full scale in the first five-year plan (1952–1957). Not long after that 
transplantation of the Soviet model, because of conflicts between the Soviet model and the existing 
Chinese governance structure, there occurred several major political/economic campaigns that led at great 
cost to two vast waves of decentralization: the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural 
Revolution in the late 1960s. The development of the rural industrial sector before the reforms that began 
in the late 1970s is partly a consequence of the decentralization waves, which empowered and enabled 
local governments (Xu 2008), and is partly rooted in entrepreneurial traditions, especially in the coastal 
areas, that can be traced back through several hundred years of history in the textile industry, the pottery 
industry, the tea processing industry, and so on.  
In the first wave of regional decentralization, people’s communes were established in all the rural 
areas in China. The people’s communes played a dual role in the rural areas: they were both the lowest 
government apparatus and the highest level of the rural collective system. The commune itself was 
organized hierarchically—the immediate subordinate units of the commune were brigades, and at the 
bottom level of the collective hierarchy were production teams. In addition to Mao’s policy of 
encouraging rural industries, the budgets of communes and brigades mainly came from the commune and 
brigade enterprises (CBEs). All of this gave the communes and brigades strong incentives to set up CBEs. 
As part of the People’s Commune Campaign and the Great Leap Forward Campaign, in the late 
1950s the central government launched a campaign to “run industry by the masses.” During these 
campaigns, CBEs grew rapidly. In 1958, the total employment of CBEs was 18 million and the gross 
value of CBE products was 6 billion yuan (Table 1). However, during the mass movements, without 
markets and without rigorous bureaucratic rules, many CBE products were useless except as accounting 
figures. Following the failure of the Great Leap Forward Campaign, and facing extremely severe 
shortages of raw materials, the central government decided to shut down most CBEs. From 1960 to 1963, 
the number of CBEs dropped from 117,000 to 11,000 and the gross output value of CBE products fell 
from 1.98 billion yuan to 0.42 billion yuan. CBE growth began anew with the recovery of the economy. 
In the late 1960s, the CBEs had recovered to their late 1950s level (Xu 1995). 
The second wave of Chinese regional decentralization occurred in the Cultural Revolution (1966–
1976). During that period, a huge amount of resources were decentralized and tens of thousands of small 
SOEs and collective-owned enterprises (COEs) were set up (Xu 2008). The growth of small local SOEs 
and urban COEs accumulated human capital and made it easier for the rural sector to boost industrial 
output both in the form of technology and in terms of producer goods. CBEs have grown quickly since 
the 1970s, particularly since the mid-1970s. In 1976, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, the CBEs 
numbered 1.1 million and the gross output of CBEs was 27.2 billion yuan. 
Table 1. Output growth of CBEs (the predecessor of the TVEs), 1957–1979 (in billion yuan at 
constant 1980) 
Year  Output  Year  Output 
1957  2.79  1971  11.1 
1958  6.91  1972  13.5 
1960  2.17  1973  15.5 
1961  2.08  1974  18.5 
1962  0.79  1975  23.7 
1963  0.40  1976  30.4 
1964  0.46  1978  55.0 
1965  0.55  1979  61.2 
Sources: Chinese Agricultural Yearbook, 1986; Xu (1995).  
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Rise of TVEs and Major TVE Models  
The Chinese economic reform started with agriculture in the late 1970s. The essence of the reform was 
decollectivization of landownership. The most important part of the reform was officially called the 
household responsibility system (HRS). During the first period of HRS implementation between 1978 and 
1984, output in the Chinese agricultural sector increased by more than 61%, and 78% of the increase in 
productivity in Chinese agriculture in that period was due to changes in HRS reform (McMillan et al. 
1989). Lin (1992) reported that the dominant source of growth in agriculture output during 1978–1984 
was the change from the production-team system to HRS, which was directly responsible for 49% of the 
output growth. Moreover, 46% of the output growth came from increases in inputs. As a result of the 
agriculture reform’s success, the commune system was officially abandoned in 1984. Consequently, all 
the commune governments were converted into township governments and all the CBEs were officially 
renamed township-village enterprises, or TVEs. The major function of a township government was 
transformed from agriculture into managing or setting up TVEs.  
Officially, TVEs are collectively owned enterprises located in townships (or villages). All the 
people in the township or village that “sets up” the TVE own the firm collectively. A township 
government is regarded as the “representative” of the people in the community, and thus it is the de facto 
executive owner of the TVEs in the community. Typically the control rights of TVEs are partly delegated 
to managers through a contract (officially called the management responsibility contract). It was common 
for employees of a TVE to collectively sign a contract with the executive “owner”—the township 
government (Weitzman and Xu 1994). 
By conventional wisdom, firms with vaguely defined property rights should perform poorly; 
however, TVE performance was spectacular. Between 1981 and 1990, the total industrial output of TVEs 
grew at an average annual rate of 28.1%, which doubled that of the national average and more than tripled 
that of the state sector. With the rapid growth of TVEs, the status of the TVE sector changed from a 
subsidiary subsector of agriculture to the second largest sector in the national economy. In the nonstate 
sector, about 80% of the output was produced by TVE and similar cooperatives. The TVE sector 
outcompeted the state sector in both growth rate and productivity. As a result of the TVE sector’s fast 
growth, the nonstate sector’s share of industrial output increased from 22% in 1978 to 47% in 1991, while 
the state sector’s share declined from 78% to 53% in the same period (Qian and Xu 1993). Furthermore, 
the growth rate of total factor productivity of TVEs was about 10 times that of state enterprises 
(Weitzman and Xu 1994). TVE development peaked in the mid-1990s, as shown in Table 2. Employment 
in the TVE sector reached 61 million in 1995. TVEs’ share of gross domestic product (GDP) increased 
from 14.3% in 1980 to 37.5% in 1995 (Table 3). It is no exaggeration that the TVE was the major engine 
of China’s growth and industrialization in the early stages of China’s reforms. The productivity of the 
TVE sector and TVEs’ contribution to the national economy in the first stage of the Chinese economic 
reform is comparable to that of the small and medium-sized enterprises in Japan and South Korea in the 
postwar era (Xu 1995).   
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Table 2. Employment by ownership in selected years (in thousands) 
   Year  Total  SOE  FDI 
Taiwan, HK, 
Marco  TVEs 
Private 
Enterprises 
Jiangsu               
  1980  2,821.0   402.0       388.6    
  1985  3,263.0   468.8       627.1   114.8  
  1990  4,225.0   536.9       672.9   223.2  
  1995  4,385.2   576.2          18.0   19.3   668.4   256.3  
  2000  4,418.1   411.4          31.4   20.0   295.5   560.2  
Zhejiang               
  1980  1,856.4   208.5       234.9    
  1985  2,318.6   240.7       374.8   90.6  
  1990  2,554.5   280.9       352.4   143.1  
  1995  2,621.5   294.6          12.7   12.4   382.4   413.3  
  2000  2,726.1   208.2          13.9   15.9   298.4   582.0  
Guangdong             
  1980  2,367.8   563.6       204.9    
  1985  2,731.1   660.8       250.0   152.0  
  1990  3,118.1   785.5       337.6   320.7  
  1995  3,551.2   565.5          35.8   94.1   569.5   502.6  
  2000  3,989.3   425.5          43.0   102.7   507.2   421.1  
China               
  1980  42,361.0   8,019.0       3,000.0    
  1985  49,873.0   8,990.0       4,152.1   2,826.9  
  1990  64,749.0   10,346.0       4,592.4   4,672.3  
  1995  68,065.0   11,261.0        241.0   272.0   6,060.3   6,801.7  
   2000  72,085.0   8,101.9        332.0   310.3   3,832.8   8,986.8  
Sources: The total and SOE employment for the three provinces are from various issues of the corresponding provincial 
statistical yearbooks, while the same data at the national level is from China Statistical Yearbooks. The employment data for the 
enterprises owned by foreign, Hong Kong, Marco, and Taiwan come from various issues of China Statistical Yearbooks. The 
employment data for the TVEs and private enterprises are from China Township and Village Enterprise Statistical Materials, 
1978–2002 (TVES/MOA 2003).  
 
Table 3. GDP by ownership in selected years (in billion yuan) 
     Total  SOE  TVEs  Private Enterprises 
Jiangsu           
  1980             15.1                8.7                4.6    
  1985             30.8              12.7              12.9   1.2  
  1990             63.4              21.8              27.9   4.2  
  1995           246.8              53.0            147.4   17.7  
  2000           384.9              84.1            112.8   131.4  
Zhejiang           
  1980               7.4                4.2                2.0    
  1985             17.9                6.6                7.9   1.5  
  1990             36.4              11.4              15.7   6.0  
  1995           164.6              23.7              69.5   75.0  
  2000           294.6              40.7            106.9   177.1   
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Table 3. Continued 
     Total  SOE  TVEs  Private Enterprises 
Guangdong         
  1980               9.0                5.3                1.6    
  1985             18.6              10.4                5.1   2.0  
  1990             52.3              21.1              14.6   10.3  
  1995           244.9              39.2              80.6   26.3  
  2000           446.3            103.5            117.1   101.7  
China           
  1980           199.7            151.7              28.5    
  1985           344.9            223.7              56.3   21.0  
  1990           685.8            374.5            167.3   83.1  
  1995        2,495.1            830.7            935.9   523.6  
   2000        4,003.4         1,377.8            942.5   1,773.1  
Sources: The GDP data for China as a whole for the whole period and SOEs for 1995 and 2000 are from various issues of China 
Statistical Yearbooks. The GDP data for TVEs and private enterprises come from China Township and Village Enterprise 
Statistical Materials, 1978–2002 (TVES/MOA 2003). Because the GDP data for SOEs were not available prior to 1995, we 
calculate them based on the ratio of total GDP to total gross industrial output value and the gross industrial output value of SOEs.  
Because of China’s vast size, local circumstances varied across its regions, as did the TVE model, 
which was an organizational response to both the macroeconomic environment and local conditions. The 
rise of TVEs is illustrated in the rich and colorful regional models of such enterprises. Notably, regions 
with strong TVE development often have a historical tradition of entrepreneurship and a strong social 
norm benefiting business activities. For example, the Wenzhou tradition of commerce originated centuries 
ago; documentation can be traced back to at least the Song Dynasty (the 11th century). Many of Marco 
Polo’s narratives of wealthy China (the 12th century) were depictions of southern Jiangsu. Entrepreneurs 
in southern Jiangsu and the Pearl River Delta (Guangdong) region built the earliest private modern 
industrial centers in China in the 19th century.
2
In general, TVEs in this region were characteristically large-scale collective processing 
industries. In the Sunan model, local/community government officials were the leading entrepreneurs. 
  
Another determining factor of TVE development is the role local government plays in providing 
protections, allocating resources, coordinating activities, and so on. As the de facto executive owners of 
the TVEs, local governments had a strong incentive to promote TVE development in their communities. 
But their method of involvement is not necessarily the same across regions, as the following three models 
demonstrate.  
The “Sunan” model refers to the governance mode of TVEs located in southern Jiangsu province, 
including the cities of Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou, with a population of 14 million. The most 
distinctive feature of the Sunan model is the leading role of community government. With the geographic 
advantage of proximity to Shanghai, which housed a significant number of SOEs, many TVEs were 
initially established in southern Jiangsu to work on subcontract orders from SOEs in Shanghai. They 
hired managers and engineers from the Shanghai SOEs, and their entrepreneurial officials moved 
aggressively in hiring skilled workers and copying technologies from the SOEs. They also adopted more 
flexible management and incentive structures than the SOEs had. By the 1980s, in southern Jiangsu, 
community governments developed the largest TVEs (without foreign direct investment, or FDI) in the 
nation.  
                                                       
2 Interestingly, initial wealth, natural resources, and proximity to industrial centers are not prerequisites for TVE 
development. For instance, Taizhou and Wenzhou were both poor and remote mountainous regions in Zhejiang province but now 
are among the richest regions in China due to the development of entrepreneurial firms.  
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They set up the TVEs, took business risks, were in charge of the TVEs’ daily operations, helped obtain 
credit from state banks, secured land to build factories, won access to raw materials and built marketing 
channels, sometimes through their connections with SOEs.  
As a result of the rapid development of TVEs, more than half of family income in southern 
Jiangsu came from TVEs and on average at least one member of the local families worked in a TVE. The 
Sunan model witnessed the golden age of TVE development up to the mid-1990s. As tables 2 and 3 show, 
from 1980 to 1995 TVE employment in Jiangsu province (most TVEs in the province were located in 
southern Jiangsu) increased by three-quarters and TVEs’ share of GDP enlarged from less than one-third 
to 60%. In fact, the Sunan model is much more general than it is restricted to southern Jiangsu. Indeed, it 
is often applied in a more general way to all the TVE developments in which community government 
plays an essential role in firm decisions, such as those in northern Zhejiang province and those in coastal 
Shandong province. 
The “Guangdong” model refers to the features of TVE development in the Pearl River Delta area. 
Similar to that in southern Jiangsu, there was also a prereform TVE development in this area with deep 
direct involvement of community governments. After Shenzhen, Shantou, Zhuhai, and other cities were 
developed as special economic zones in the early 1980s, TVEs in this area successfully attracted massive 
investments from overseas diasporas, in particular from Hong Kong and Taiwan, as shown in Table 2, 
benefiting from their geographical proximity. Thus, the Guangdong model is characterized by a dominant 
community government presence together with heavy FDI involvement, which also brought in 
technology, management know-how, and marketing channels in the international market.  
The development of TVEs was so overwhelmingly important in local economies in the southern 
Guangdong area that many local governments transformed themselves into de facto headquarters of TVE 
conglomerates. The so-called “local corporatism” embodies this feature (Oi 1999). Indeed, local 
corporatism is a general phenomenon applicable to all TVE developments where community government 
played dominant roles, as in the Sunan and Guangdong models.  
Unlike the Sunan and Guangdong models, the Wenzhou model does not have any geographic 
advantage in access to SOEs and FDI. The city of Wenzhou, with a population of 7.8 million, is located in 
the mountainous region in southern Zhejiang province. It was remote from big cities and from any major 
production or trading centers, had poor transportation systems, and used to be one of the poorest regions 
in China with limited arable land. With a much less developed state and collective sector and a more 
isolated environment, and under the prereform political/legal condition that private business was not fully 
legal, Wenzhou was forced to make more institutional innovations in promoting private ownership and 
cluster-based production organizations than other regions.  
In contrast with the Sunan and Guangdong models, in which local government officials are the 
key entrepreneurs who take risks and initiatives, the Wenzhou model is a reaction of local government to 
spontaneous private business development. In Wenzhou, most businesses are driven by private 
entrepreneurs. The critical role of local government is to provide a favorable business environment, 
particularly protection. Just as with the other two TVE models, development of the Wenzhou model 
mirrored TVE development in many other areas. Indeed, TVE development in Wenzhou’s southern 
neighboring area of Taizhou in Zhejiang province is just as impressive as that in Wenzhou. With a total 
population of more than 13 million (30% larger than Hungary), Wenzhou and Taizhou together have 
developed the most dynamic private sector in China and have experienced one of the fastest prolonged 
growth rates among all Chinese regions.  
Although development of private business is the central feature of the Wenzhou model, the 
constitution of China did not protect private property rights until 2004. Thus, private entrepreneurs in 
Wenzhou faced questions about how to circumvent ownership risk. This was not only a problem the 
entrepreneurs needed resolved but was also a great challenge facing the local governments. To avoid 
direct conflicts with the legal system and with political resistance, many private enterprises resorted to 
cover-up practices such as attaching themselves to state agents. Local governments in the Wenzhou area, 
from municipal governments to township governments, not only gave a green light to these practices but 
also sometimes facilitated them. Some private firms became affiliated with SOEs by paying to use their  
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name, stationery, receipts, account numbers, and so forth. Some other private firms chose to register as 
collectives with neighborhood or village committees (Tsai 2002; Huang, Zhang, and Zhu 2008). In 
essence, these “TVEs” were disguised private firms. With the “red hat,” the enterprises not only managed 
to legalize their private enterprises but also gained access to formal financing. Ironically, it was under this 
kind of “unconstitutional,” “red hat” protection from local governments that private business in Wenzhou 
boomed. Therefore, the Wenzhou model is substantially different from the other two models.  
The rapid growth of disguised private firms in Wenzhou caught the attention of the central 
government. In 1985, top national leaders visited Wenzhou and nodded to the practice of private firms’ 
wearing a “red hat.” In 1987, the State Council officially approved Wenzhou as one of the national rural 
pilot reforms with a focus on TVE institutional building (Zhu 2007). The so-called pilot reform was 
centered on developing regulatory remedies to allow private business to develop in the absence of 
constitutional protection of private property rights. In August 1987, an experimental regulation titled 
Interim Administrative Provisions for Registered Operations was officially issued in Wenzhou. Here, 
“registered operations” refers to a remedy operation that gives private businesses legal identity and legal 
status. This regulation protected and encouraged private business when constitutional protection was 
absent. Under the regulation, private businesses were allowed and encouraged to be affiliated with 
collectively owned or state-owned enterprises by name, which made private businesses legal and 
simultaneously independent. Moreover, the regulation helped private businesses by opening up multiple 
channels, including helping them obtain bank loans, procure raw materials and other inputs, and sell their 
products, as well as other advantages.  
The Wenzhou government initiated another major reform policy, which was aimed at protecting 
private business by forming so-called “joint-stock cooperative enterprises.” The highlighted word here is 
“cooperative,” which made the company a legitimate “socialist enterprise” under the legal framework at 
that time. Indeed, most of the shareholders of these companies were employees of the same firm at the 
same time. They were peasants who had just left the land to engage in nonagriculture activities and were 
directly engaged in the firm’s activities. The protection this policy provided was critically important for 
private businesses to survive and to grow through joint stock and other means of fund-raising.  
In summary, TVEs were dynamic production organizations that adapted to the weak legal 
environment and local comparative advantages early in China’s transition from a planned to a market 
economy. There are some regional variants in TVE development because of differences among local 
environments. The TVEs’ governance structures and evolutionary paths depended on many factors, such 
as inherited institutional arrangements, resource endowments, a location’s comparative advantage, 
entrepreneurial tradition, and others.  
Explanation of the Rise of TVEs 
The rapid growth of TVEs despite their vaguely defined property rights seems to defy the mainstream 
thinking of development economics (Weitzman and Xu 1994). From a viewpoint based on “standard 
wisdom,” the governance of these firms appears deficient and should be less productive than private firms 
with well-defined property rights. However, at the beginning of the period of reform, private ownership 
was still an ideological taboo, and therefore private firms were not a choice. Under that institutional 
constraint, TVEs were a more viable production organization choice than SOEs to meet changing market 
demand.  
A critical factor determining the growth of TVEs was Chinese regional decentralization. Indeed, 
as discussed already, from the very beginning TVE development itself was a direct outcome of regional 
decentralization. Fierce regional competition since the economic reforms gave subnational government 
officials, particularly county and township officials, a strong incentive to initiate or support the 
development of TVEs. It also created strong reasons for local governments to protect the properties of 
TVEs. Moreover, relatively self-contained subnational economies provided opportunities for TVEs to 
grow. Many subnational government officials, particularly community government officials, converted 
themselves into entrepreneurs. In many regions, local governments played profound roles as  
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entrepreneurs in setting up TVEs, taking risks, making investments, and searching for business directions 
(e.g., Qian and Xu 1993; Chang and Wang 1994; Li 1996; Che and Qian 1998; Chen and Rozelle 1999). 
Overall, although the de jure property rights of TVEs were not well defined at the national level, local 
governments provided de facto protections of property rights as a functional substitute for weak formal 
property rights. As a result, TVEs benefited from the implicit instrumental protections local governments 
offered (Zhang 2007).  
It is worth mentioning that similar mechanisms are at work today, after the decline of the TVEs, 
in assisting entrepreneurial firms regardless of ownership. That is, besides the importance of the 
development of the TVE sector itself, the mechanism that facilitated the TVE sector development 
provides institutional conditions for the rapid development of the private sector that replaced the TVEs.  
The booming TVE sector also benefited from the favorable macroeconomic situation at the time. 
After the success of rural reforms, farmers’ income experienced an unprecedented increase, as did the 
demand for many daily consumer products. The TVEs could produce a broad range of products. 
However, because SOEs were accustomed to privileged access to a variety of scarce materials and capital 
goods through quotas, they were irresponsive to changing market conditions. Without any favorable 
access to inputs, TVEs had to compete in the marketplace for survival. The dual pricing reform, which 
immediately followed the successful rural reform, allowed SOEs to sell unused input quotas at market 
price to the TVEs, which were outside the command economy. Such exchanges not only protected the 
original privileges of SOEs but also presented TVEs with a window of opportunity to access industrial 
inputs via market channels and expand their market share.  
Although decentralization was a nationwide policy, TVEs were developed better in some regions 
than others. Therefore, regional decentralization alone is not sufficient to explain the success of TVEs. As 
a matter of fact, most TVE employees and managers and a substantial number of township-village 
officials lived in the same community for generations, given that there was almost no migration before the 
early 1990s. Under certain conditions, close long-term interactions among community members (virtually 
infinitely repeated overlapping generational relationships) might foster a social norm within the 
community that may facilitate informal institutions such as TVEs. In contrast, SOEs are not organized 
based on natural communities, such as villages; many of the informal mechanisms prevailing in TVEs 
would not function in SOEs. Therefore, region-specific local social norms, such as trust, may be an 
important factor behind the informal institutions of TVEs, such as implicit contractual relationships 
between community governments and TVEs and between TVE employees and between TVEs themselves 
(Weitzman and Xu 1994). This explanation shares the same spirit of the evolutionary repeated game 
theory of social norms (Axelrod 1984; Fudenberg and Maskin 2008). Empirically it sheds light on 
substantial regional differences in TVE development that reflect the history of diversified Chinese 
regional economic development. Once again, the mechanism of social norms is not unique to TVE 
development. Indeed, regions with better “trust” and other pro-business social norms enjoyed better 
development in private business as well, as is discussed later in this paper. 
To summarize, TVEs emerged as adaptations to weak legal protections of property rights, 
expanding market opportunities, and a rich historical and cultural heritage. Their very successful 
development is not only the process of building up entrepreneurial firms but also the process of creating 
the conditions under which the private sector would thrive. Contrasting the Chinese TVE model with the 
painful lessons from most of the privatization programs implemented in countries in central and eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union suggests that privatization requires certain economic, legal, and 
political conditions. Private ownership cannot survive without legal protections. Private firms cannot be 
efficient if there is no product market, labor market, or capital market. Therefore, not only is TVE 
development not an unnecessary detour from a straightforward privatization program but it has helped to 
create political and economic conditions for private business. This argument is empirically supported by 
the fact that regions that now boast strong private business development often had strong TVE 




3.  THE DECLINE OF TVES AND THE RISE OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEUR FIRMS 
The decline of the TVE sector is a happy ending. That is, it comes as a result of privatization and further 
development, rather than of shrinkage of the firms in the TVE sector. To some extent, the decline of the 
TVEs is a mirror image of the rise of the private firms. A common feature of different regional TVE 
models is that they were all embedded with a transitional feature when there were no proper political and 
economic conditions for private business. With the rapid development of both TVEs and private firms 
since the late 1980s, resistance against and fears over private ownership have gradually vanished. As 
political attitudes toward private ownership changed, various regulations and laws in favor of better 
protection of private property were introduced. By 2004, private property ownership was formally 
recognized by the Chinese constitution. With such an improved institutional environment, TVEs lost 
ground in the marketplace through competition with private firms despite their previous ability to adapt to 
weakly protected property rights. Since the late 1990s, a large number of TVEs have been transformed 
into private firms (Xu 2008).  
The sharp decline of employment levels in the TVEs in all the three leading areas and in the 
nation in the late 1990s (Table 2) and the dramatic decrease of output growth rates of TVEs in the same 
period (Table 3) reflect the magnitude of privatization of TVEs. The change in Jiangsu province in the 
late 1990s is particularly impressive in that TVE employment declined by more than half and TVE output 
declined by about one-quarter. At the same time, private sector employment in Jiangsu province more 
than doubled and output increased by more than seven times, the fastest expansion in the nation. 
Interestingly, the Sunan model eventually followed the Wenzhou model in reforming firm governance 
structures.  
In hindsight, it seems natural that all three TVE models should converge to the model dominated 
by private or shareholding firms; however, at the beginning of the reform, the path of TVE growth was 
not clear at all. The presence of multiple models created a regional competition for local governments to 
identify and test the best firm structures for China’s unique economic and political situation. In the end, 
the Wenzhou model prevailed. The massive privatization of TVEs in the late 1990s largely followed the 
path of the Wenzhou model. To a large extent, the path of TVE development was a discovery process 
without a predetermined trend.  
The Rise of Entrepreneur Firms in Zhejiang Province 
In this section, we focus on entrepreneur firms in Zhejiang province for two reasons. First, the Wenzhou 
model discussed earlier originated in Zhejiang province, and that model’s success illustrates an important 
facet of the subsequent nationwide TVE privatization. Second, as a direct outcome of the outstanding 
development of TVEs, Zhejiang has the largest indigenous private sector of all China’s provinces, 
accounting for more than 60% of the province’s output in 2000 (Table 3). Indeed, concerning TVE 
development in Zhejiang province, when reform had just started, employment in the province’s TVE 
sector was already 13% more than that of the state sector (Table 2). This is the highest in China. 
Moreover, two of the three major TVE models prevailed in Zhejiang. The Wenzhou model originated in 
southern Zhejiang, whereas the Sunan model applies to TVE development in northern Zhejiang.  
Thanks to the fast growth of TVEs and closely associated private business since the early 1980s, 
Zhejiang province has become one of the richest provinces in China. With strong local government 
support, many Zhejiang private businesses expanded rapidly through enlarging scale and integration, and 
became large corporations or even multinationals, such as China Feiyue Group, which has branches in 
more than 40 countries and accounts for 50% of the world market share for sewing machines, and Geely 
Automobile, the first independent Chinese carmaker, which is listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  
At the same time, with local government–provided political and economic infrastructure, small 
entrepreneurial firms have grown extremely rapidly not only in numbers but also in efficiency. An 
important efficiency-enhancing trend is that small entrepreneurial firms have become increasingly 
specialized and clustered. These specialized small firms are linked together by networks of subcontracts  
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where each final product is produced by a collection of many specialized firms. With concentrations of a 
vast number of small specialized firms, many townships in Zhejiang have become national or 
international centers of certain products. For example, Datang township makes one-third of the world’s 
socks; 40% of the world’s neckties are made in Shengzhou township; more than 70% of the buttons for 
clothes made in China come from Qiaotou township; Songxia township produces 350 million umbrellas 
every year (Hessler 2007); and Puyuan township outputs more than 500 million cashmere sweaters per 
year.
3
A Case Study of Puyuan Entrepreneurial Firms
 
Next we present two in-depth case studies of private entrepreneur firms in Zhejiang province to 
illustrate the rise of such firms and their intimate connections with TVEs in the past and with local 
government today.  
4
Here we use the Puyuan cashmere production in Zhejiang province to illustrate the operation of 
entrepreneurial firms and the role of township governments. Puyuan township of Tongxiang county, 
Zhejiang province, is the largest production/trading center for cashmere sweaters in China with market 
transaction turnovers topping 10 billion yuan and a business volume amounting to nearly 500 million 
cashmere sweaters, which accounts for 60% of the national total. As of 2005, nearly 12,000 firms and 
more than 70,000 people were engaged in the production of cashmere sweaters, and there were nearly 
6,000 sweater-trading shops, in this township (Table 4). One can trace the entrepreneurial tradition in 
Puyuan back to the 12th century (Song Dynasty) when Pu silk (Pu-chou) was invented there and 
renowned nationwide. Textile industrial clustering is part of a tradition that has been prevalent in this area 
since the 15th century (Chen 1996). The operation of such textile clusters shares many features with 
today’s Puyuan clusters. 
 
Table 4. Number of firms and employment in Puyuan cashmere industry, 2005 
Type  Firms  Employment 
Yarn dealers  250  535 
Family weaving workshops  3,518  42,074 
Dyeing factories  23  1,150 
Finishing factories  42  3,073 
Printing workshops  100  500 
Ironing workshops  100  318 
Sweater shops   5,750  12,133 
Transport (independent drivers)  2,000  2,000 
Integrated firms  121  8,254 
Total  11,905  70,037 
Sources: Puyuan Township Statistical Center, Administrative Committee of Puyuan Industrial Park, and Administrative 
Committee of Puyuan Marketplace.  
The manufacturing of cashmere in Puyuan started in 1976 when a TVE (called a CBE at that 
time), the Puyuan Tanhua [Weaving] Production Cooperative, began producing cashmere sweaters. The 
                                                       
3 In addition to the salient development of cluster formation in Zhejiang, national statistics indicate a general trend of 
clustering of small firms. In the period 1995–2004, the industrial location-concentration rate increased by 16%; the number of 
firms in the top three locations with the highest concentration relative to other areas rose by 41% from 3.28 to 4.64 (Long and 
Zhang 2008). 
4 This section draws heavily from Ruan and Zhang (2008, 2009).  
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gross output value of the cooperative soared from 28,000 yuan to 300,000 yuan in just one year, 
prompting the group to devote all of its production capacity to cashmere sweaters by the end of 1977. 
This firm’s huge success prompted farmers in nearby villages and workers from the township- and 
village-owned enterprises to set up their own cashmere sweater production workshops.  
Meanwhile, market demand for clothes surged exponentially after the success of rural reform in 
the mid-1980s, and this ever-increasing demand greatly stimulated production. Facing severe credit 
constraints, most entrepreneurs initially worked at home using a few secondhand weaving machines and 
sold the sweaters along a main road linking Shanghai and Hangzhou. These small businesses faced the 
major problem of the lack of a trading place. In April 1988, the township government and the local 
administration for industry and commerce constructed a cashmere sweater marketplace by investing more 
than a half million yuan. The marketplace provided space and facilities for shops, storage, and workshops 
for cashmere merchants and producers. Both local merchants and those from other regions in the province 
quickly moved into it. The concentration of businesses in the marketplace greatly enhanced productivity 
by deepening the division of labor. In 1990, the township produced more than 2.8 million sweaters, and 
approximately 90% of the households in Puyuan township and its peripheral villages were engaged in the 
production of cashmere sweaters. 
By 1992, the old marketplace had exceeded its capacity. Between 1992 and 1994, the local 
government raised another nearly 100 million yuan and built 11 more marketplaces for intermediate 
inputs and cashmere sweaters. Once again, the new marketplaces were very popular and quickly filled 
with merchants from all around China. The establishment of standard markets for intermediate and final 
goods enabled small family workshops to easily access raw materials, intermediate inputs, and national 
markets. Easy market access also lowered transportation and marketing costs, which eased the severity of 
the credit constraint problem. As a result, the majority of entrepreneurs chose to specialize in only one 
stage of production—further deepening the division of labor. Cashmere sweater production recorded an 
explosive growth in this period. As of 1994, Puyuan’s sweater production capacity reached as many as 10 
million pieces with market sales exceeding 2 billion yuan, making it the largest cashmere sweater 
production center in China.  
By the late 1990s, the large expansion of low-end cashmere sweaters had largely driven prices 
down. The profit margin for enterprises producing high-quality, brand-name sweaters was much greater, 
but Puyuan had very few well-known local brands at that time. Thus in 2000, the local government set up 
an industrial park of 2,245 mu (1 mu = 0.067 hectare) in an attempt to attract well-known cashmere 
sweater enterprises with famous brands from elsewhere in China. The industrial park also offers favorable 
policies, such as land, tax, and credit, to brand-name producers. In addition, the local government devised 
policies to encourage local enterprises with excellent growth potential to settle in the park, expand their 
production, and establish their brands. Most enterprises in the industrial park are large integrated factories 
with their own brands.  
The township government also took responsibility for maintaining quality by enacting two 
decrees on the quality of cashmere products. The county quality control bureau set up branch offices in 
the main marketplaces so as to better enforce quality regulations. Moreover, the provincial-level public 
notarization agents and inspection companies were invited to set up a quality inspection center in the town 
to provide quality certification. Furthermore, the government established a human resource development 
center to train employees of cashmere production firms. Given the high turnover rates for employees in 
clusters and the fact that most firms are very small, this public training program is essential for 
maintaining the quality and efficiency of the cluster.  
Started from small family businesses, two models evolved in Puyuan: partially integrated firms 
and completely nonintegrated clusters of small firms (the “putting-out system”) (see Figure 1). About 
one-ninth of all employees in the Puyuan cashmere industry worked in partially integrated firm as of 
2007. Most of the partially integrated firms have their own brands or engage in OEM (original equipment 
manufacturer) production for other manufacturers. Most of them are located in the industrial park and 
own factory buildings. As shown in the lower part of Figure 1, they purchase yarn from the yarn dealers 
in the marketplace or from yarn factories directly and complete the weaving process in-house. In a typical  
12 
 
case dyeing is not integrated into the firm. They outsource semifinished goods to specialized dyeing 
factories and finishing factories. After this process, the products are then ironed, sorted, and packaged 
inside the factory before being ultimately shipped out to the national market through the logistics center. 
An integrated firm has an average of more than 2.6 million yuan of fixed assets, about 132 times a typical 
worker’s annual salary. In 2005, there were 121 such integrated firms and more than 20% of their starting 
capital came from banks. Based on these statistics, it appears that most entrepreneurs with limited capital 
cannot get involved in the integrated mode of sweater production.  
Most small firms or family workshops instead opt to operate in an alternative way within the 
cluster system, as the upper part of Figure 1 shows. Sweater merchants are leading entrepreneurs in 
coordinating production processes. These merchants either rent or own shops in the township’s designated 
sweater marketplaces. They often imitate the designs of big companies or emulate designs from fashion 
magazines, and they make sample sweaters. The sample sweaters displayed in their shops usually bear 
their own trademarks. As the largest cashmere sweater market in China, many merchants visit the shops 
in the trading areas of Puyuan.  










Integrated Factory System 






































Note: The dashed-line chart in the figure represents the production processes of sweater shops. The solid arrows denote the actual 
flow route of the raw materials and semifinished goods, and the dashed arrows show information exchange among the entities.  
When receiving orders or after production decisions are made based on expectations of 
marketing, leading entrepreneurs purchase the raw materials and deliver them to the subcontracting  
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weaving workshops down the production chain. Then, the semifinished goods are sent from weaving 
workshops to the subcontracting dyeing factories, which in turn pass the goods on to the finishing 
factories. Printing and ironing workshops receive these goods after the finishing stage. In the end, the 
products are packaged in the sweater merchants’ shops. The main reason the merchants package in their 
own shops, instead of leaving it to the subcontracting shops, is to inspect quality. If they spot any quality 
problems, they trace them back to the sources of production and resolve the issue with the responsible 
party. In this business model, raw materials and intermediate products are frequently transported from one 
processing point to another by a number of three-wheeler drivers. The most important players in the 
industrial cluster are the leading entrepreneurs, who coordinate yarn dealers, family weaving workshops, 
dyeing factories, finishing factories, printing workshops, ironing workshops, and three-wheeler drivers to 
engage all the production processes. After passing through this large-scale “assembly line,” the final 
products are transported to other markets through the Puyuan logistics center. 
Although small firms have many advantages, the lack of a scale economy is a major shortcoming. 
By forming clusters of small firms and providing centralized infrastructures, the local government 
handled this problem. Take the ironing process, which requires a large amount of fixed-cost investments, 
as an example. The local government has located all the ironing workshops in a designated zone of the 
industrial park, where natural gas is centrally supplied. With greatly reduced fixed costs, setting up small 
ironing workshops becomes viable. This in turn further deepens the division of labor, which results in a 
further reduction in capital requirements.  
The capital requirement for specialized small firms engaged in the cluster mode of production is 
substantially lower than that of integrated firms. For example, the capital cost over labor cost ratios are 
between 0.25 and 6, whereas the average ratio for  
integrated firms is substantially higher than 100. This considerably lowered entry barriers, as the upper 
panel of Figure 1 illustrates. As a result, the small firms engaged in putting-out production account for 
72% of total employment (more than 72,000) in the sweater cluster.  
A Case Study of the Wenzhou Footwear Cluster
5
In terms of output quantity, Wenzhou is home to the largest footwear cluster in the world. In 2004, the 
cluster produced 835 million pairs of shoes. Since the 1970s, Wenzhou has developed a highly 
specialized and coordinated industrial cluster consisting of thousands of firms involved in various stages 
of shoemaking (see Figure 2). Over the last few decades, its market share has grown from small into the 
largest in China.  
Wenzhou has a long tradition of shoe-making. At the onset of the reform, almost all shoes in 
Wenzhou, about a half million pairs annually, were produced by two state-owned factories and eight 
collectively owned factories (TVEs are collectively owned firms). These firms served as “seed factories,” 
training a large number of technical workers, marketing specialists, and managers, laying the groundwork 
for the emergence of the Wenzhou shoemaking industry in the subsequent reform era.  
 
                                                       
5 This section draws heavily from Huang, Zhang, and Zhu (2008).  
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Source: Adapted from Huang, Zhang, and Zhu (2008). 
Indeed, many private enterprises in the Wenzhou footwear industrial cluster can be traced back in 
history to one of the collectively owned enterprises. Figure 3 traces the origins of today’s major footwear 
firms. The 19 firms on the left are the original footwear firms of the late 1970s.
6
                                                       
6 Due to space limitation, the figure lists only 12 firm names.  
 The firms shown in the 
boxes in the middle and to the right are today’s best-known private footwear firms; their relationships 
with the original firms are depicted.  
As with the development of TVEs, one of the most important factors nurturing the extraordinary 
growth of the private ownership–based footwear cluster was local government support. However, this 
time the government support was indirect, via setting up numerous specialized markets. The following is 
a list of some better-known markets: the Wenzhou “Footwear Capital” Market, the Hetongqiao Footwear 
Accessories and Ornamental Materials Market, the South Zhejiang Footwear Accessories and Ornamental 
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Specialized markets for footwear materials, machines, leather, chemical products  
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Source: Adapted from Huang, Zhang, and Zhu (2008).  
Note: All the firms in the middle and to the right are privately owned. 
No. 1 State-Owned  
Footwear Factory (SOE) 
Wenzhou Orient Footwear 
Factory (SOE) 
Wenzhou Leather 
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Tailong Footwear Last, 
Huang Yongbin 
 




Factory, Chen Guorong 
Chali Footwear 
Factory, Xie Aiguo 
Mr. Yu Ashou taught 16 
students, and 15 of them 




The specialized markets greatly fostered the development of specialized clusters in the footwear 
industry. Associated with this development, in Wenzhou a large number of highly specialized small firms 
operate in this industry. Apart from more than 4,000 footwear factories and workshops, there were also 
200 leather enterprises, 380 footwear sole enterprises, 200 footwear machine manufacturers, 168 footwear 
last factories, 100 footwear accessories and ornamental materials enterprises, 50 footwear design studios, 
and numerous specialized footwear-related information service agents, training schools, research 
institutes, family workshops, and so on in 2004.  
Specialized clustering effectively decomposed the shoemaking process into many small steps, 
which lowers both technical and capital barriers to entry. Moreover, it mitigates problems that 
entrepreneurs face, such as high transaction costs in scattered markets and credit constraints. Thus, it 
enables a wide range of rural workers, who otherwise would be unable to participate under the traditional 
factory system, to become entrepreneurs. Concerning the technical barrier to entry, with a fine division of 
labor, the skill requirement for each individual working within the cluster was substantially lowered. 
Consequently, entrepreneurs without much skill in shoemaking could enter. According to a survey, more 
than half of footwear industry entrepreneurs did not have any experience in the industry at the time of 
starting their firms (Huang, Zhang, and Zhu 2008). With respect to the capital barrier to entry, by dividing 
the production process into specialized tasks and creating favorable conditions for using trading credits 
among workshops within a group, clustering greatly reduced fixed costs of production. The minimum 
investment in the Wenzhou footwear industrial cluster has been lower than a migrant worker’s annual 
salary. Therefore, clustering provides entrepreneurs with a platform on which to test out their luck. 
Through competition, the best survived and grew their firms into bigger ones.  
Another critical role that the local government has played in nurturing the Wenzhou footwear 
industry is quality control. Under severe price competition, some producers started to use lower-quality 
raw materials, even fake leathers, in shoe production. In the mid-1980s, Wenzhou shoes were ridiculed as 
“one-day shoes” for their poor quality. The quality crisis reached its climax in 1987 when a dozen 
Chinese cities boycotted or banned shoes made in Wenzhou. Facing the crisis, led by the Lucheng district 
government, the quality bureau and bureau of industrial and commercial administration of Wenzhou 
established a joint footwear quality control and management office in Lucheng, the core area of the 
footwear cluster. The office randomly sampled shoes from different producers. It issued quality 
certificates for those passing the quality check, and producers that failed the test were barred from selling 
their shoes to other places and posting any commercials. At the same time, the Lucheng District Footwear 
Industry Association in Wenzhou was established to work with the Wenzhou Quality Control Bureau for 
quality control. In addition, the government provided various preferential treatments, such as land and tax 
breaks, to those firms with brand names and reputations for high quality. It also rewarded each firm that 
won the title of “nationally known brand” with 1 million yuan. With these measures in place, the footwear 
industry jumped from a vicious cycle of racing to low quality to a virtuous cycle of racing to the top.  
The Boundary of the Firm: The Township Government versus Individual Entrepreneurs  
The preceding examples represent typical industrial clusters that can be observed in many different 
industries located in numerous places in China, particularly in Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and 
Shandong. These representative cases pose an interesting challenge to the famous question Coase raised 
more than seven decades ago: “What is the boundary of the firm?” (Coase 1937). Indeed, if we put all of 
the employees and facilities of cashmere production in Puyuan together, we may think of Puyuan as a 
large production cluster of cashmere sweaters with more than 50,000 employees and occupying a 60% 
share in the Chinese cashmere sweater market. What is the boundary of the firm in the Puyuan production 
cluster?  
The modern firm theory and property rights theory (Williamson 1975; Grossman and Hart 1986; 
Hart 1995) spell out the costs and benefits of integration. In this theory a firm is a set of assets under 
common ownership. If many different assets have the same owner, then we have an integrated firm. If 
they have different owners, then there are many firms, and transactions between them are market  
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transactions. Control rights over assets give the owner power to decide how the assets should be used 
when unforeseen contingencies occur.  
The nonoverlapping distribution of control rights and property rights poses challenges to this 
theory. Most of the workshops and trading shops in the Puyuan cluster are legally owned by families. 
Thus, instead of concentrated or integrated ownership, as in a typical corporation, the Puyuan cluster has 
distributed ownership with thousands of workshop owners and trading shop owners. The most important 
feature is that although owned separately these workshops are highly coordinated with each other. The 
typical transactions between upstream workshops and downstream workshops are not based on written 
contracts, and they are more similar to those within a large firm than those in markets.
7
However, what about the costs of such a large subcontracting network without full integration? 
The key features of the Puyuan conglomerate are that it is neither fully integrated, due to its distributed 
ownership structure, nor does it participate in entirely market transactions, due to the substantial non-price 
coordination mechanisms within the conglomerate. As discussed above, all the workshops within the 
  
The most challenging issue is the control rights of the cluster. To sharpen our analysis, in the 
following we call the collection of cashmere production clusters within Puyuan a “conglomerate” (or a 
virtual conglomerate) and call each small firm a workshop of the conglomerate. Let us focus on control 
rights of strategic issues of the conglomerate. It is interesting to note that except for most of the land and 
some of the buildings in the industrial park, the township government has no ownership of the assets of 
almost all the workshops within the conglomerate. Moreover, the township government is not involved in 
the financing of these workshops. Although unlike that of the typical headquarters of a conglomerate in 
ownership and financing, the township government takes strategic responsibilities for the overall 
development of the conglomerate. It coordinates strategic matters within the conglomerate; it regulates 
quality of all the products within the conglomerate; it guards the security of the assets and production of 
the conglomerate; and its entrepreneurship determines the overall direction of the business of the 
conglomerate. All of those things make the township government similar to that of a typical conglomerate 
headquarters.  
Nevertheless, the analogy between this virtual conglomerate and a typical large corporation stops 
here. The extraordinary development of this conglomerate is an outcome of thousands of individual 
entrepreneurs and officials of the township government with strong entrepreneurial spirit. The two types 
of entrepreneurs are complementary to each other in the rapid expansion and evolution of this 
conglomerate. It is obvious that without individual entrepreneurs the whole development would not exist. 
However, without the substantial roles of the township government, the production cluster would not 
evolve into the scale, efficiency, and quality of this virtual conglomerate either.  
Although the township government exercises substantial control rights over the strategic issues of 
the conglomerate, without asset ownership in the workshops, the conglomerate is not fully integrated. As 
a result, thousands of individual entrepreneurs make decisions bearing personal risks, and they have to 
coordinate with each other in daily operations. Why not convert this virtual conglomerate into a true 
conglomerate by integration? What are the costs and benefits of nonintegration?  
Perhaps the most obvious consequence of this conglomerate is that its ownership structure 
accommodates involvement of a large number of entrepreneurs, including official entrepreneurs and 
individual entrepreneurs, operating simultaneously. Compared with hired employees, entrepreneurs have 
stronger incentives to work hard, take risks, and take initiates to improve business. Thus, a conglomerate 
based on collective entrepreneurship may outcompete a fully integrated corporation in areas where 
constant entrepreneurial actions need to be taken. Two distinctive benefits are derived from the collective 
entrepreneurship: first, creativities, flexibilities, and adaptabilities come from the large number of 
entrepreneurs; second, built-in hard budget constraints do not exist in this structure for the individual 
firms in that the “headquarters” does not have any responsibility for risks taken by individual 
entrepreneurs.  
                                                       
7 The literature documents some similar challenging phenomena, such as the subcontracting relationship between Japanese 
carmakers and part makers. For elaborated theoretical discussions on those, see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1998).  
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conglomerate are highly specialized. Although a high degree of division of labor increases productivity, 
without full integration, one may worry about transaction costs among the specialized workshops. 
Surprisingly, it turns out that the transaction costs of nonintegration are well contained in this 
conglomerate due to its scale, culture, and structure.  
First, the township government set up infrastructures to allow all workshops to be concentrated in 
a few designated areas within a three-kilometer radius of the sweater marketplace. By keeping a large 
number of small workshops close to each other, the conglomerate reduces transportation costs and helps 
information transparency substantially. With the close distance and transparency of information, most 
workshops do not maintain physical stocks. Moreover, because local governments have provided many 
essential public goods and nearby markets have covered most intermediate inputs, a firm can maintain a 
small size by just focusing on one stage of production. A firm’s structure and size depend on its local 
environment, in particular the degree of generic public goods provided either by local governments or 
other firms.  
Second, this conglomerate is organized within a community, or as a community with intensively 
repeated business interactions. Within the community people know each other well and have a social 
norm of trust. Moreover, there are a large number of workshops that compete fiercely with each other 
within the community for each specialized task. Thus, the opportunity cost for anyone to break an 
agreement is high even when the agreement is unwritten. If a workshop cannot ensure its promised 
delivery schedule and product quality, it will lose both current and potential clients because word spreads 
quickly in the community. As a result, at equilibrium, almost all transactions between the upstream and 
downstream workshops are based on oral agreements, and when business disputes arise the court system 
has very rarely been used (based on field survey results).  
Third, based on the close and repeated relationship among workshops within the community, 
workshops issue trade credits to each other. Particularly, it is most common for the upstream workshops, 
which are usually larger and have better access to bank loans, to issue trade credits to downstream 
workshops. Widespread use of trade credits has greatly reduced the financing costs of a majority of 
workshops. This reduces the capital requirement, thus lowering entry barriers (Ruan and Zhang 2009). As 





4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Township-village enterprises had a great impact on the rise of China. They served as a major stepping-
stone of institutional change when legal protections of private property rights were not in place. They also 
filled a market niche for daily goods as incomes rose rapidly along with economic reform, while SOEs 
were slow to respond.  
In essence, TVEs were an organizational response to constraints and opportunities in a location at 
a particular time. Because of significant regional differences in resource endowment and access to 
technology and capital, the path of TVE development is shown to be rather heterogeneous. The Sunan 
model capitalized on proximity to a large number of SOEs in Shanghai, while the Guangdong model 
relied heavily on FDI from Hong Kong and Taiwan. With much more limited access to SOEs and FDI, 
the local governments and entrepreneurs in Wenzhou were forced to make more institutional innovations 
by introducing private ownership and cluster-based production organizations.  
TVE development has played a key role in nurturing entrepreneurship, fostering private business 
(indirectly), spreading management skills, accumulating physical and human capital, technology 
diffusion, and training skilled workers. In fact, many private entrepreneur firms were spun off directly 
from TVEs. Recognizing the influences TVEs have had on Chinese entrepreneurship is a key to 
understanding China’s economic development. The market’s role in nurturing entrepreneurship is well 
known in economics; however, the substantial role of local governments in cultivating entrepreneurship is 
much less studied and much less understood.  
An important efficiency-enhancing trend in the Chinese private sector is that small 
entrepreneurial firms have become increasingly specialized and clustered. These specialized small firms 
are linked together by networks of subcontracts so that every final product is produced by a collection of 
many specialized firms. Segmenting a production process into many phases that numerous highly 
specialized small firms carry out involves more transactions between firms and incurs higher transaction 
costs between firms. Yet extra benefits often exist within an industrial cluster that offset the additional 
transaction costs. Repeated interactions among the firms also help reduce the coordination cost of the 
greater number of transactions associated with the deepening division of labor in a cluster. Moreover, 
monitoring costs of integrated firms are avoided. 
The evolution of TVEs and the subsequent entrepreneurial firms illustrates that economic 
development is a continual process of overcoming limiting conditions. China, like many developing 
countries, had abundant labor but limited capital at the inception of its reforms. Moreover, it lacked a 
sound financial system and formal institutions that the standard development texts regard as preconditions 
for industrialization. The structures of such firms as TVEs and the subsequent clustering modes of 
production are organizational responses to these limiting factors. TVEs were created to overcome weak 
legal protections for property rights. After private property rights were recognized, TVEs gradually lost 
ground to private firms.  
Even when private ownership is honored, a vast number of entrepreneurs still face credit and 
technical constraints, as well as institutional constraints, such as contract enforcement. Clustering offers 
one route through which poor regions like Wenzhou can overcome such constraints. With the availability 
of many specialized firms and joint public goods in a close neighborhood, firms can specialize in 
production at a small scale and many entrepreneurs can participate in the nonfarm production process. 
With massive concentrations of specialized small firms, many townships have become national or 
international production/trading centers of certain products. This successful industrial cluster 
development is an outcome of joint efforts of entrepreneurial local officials and entrepreneurial 
individuals. To a large extent, this is an extension of the institutions of the TVEs in an evolutionary path.  
From an evolutionary point of view, a firm is not an organization to be designed and implemented 
in vacuum. This is even more true when the political, legal, and economic conditions are all evolving 
from very unfavorable to better. The firm’s organizational structure is an outcome of interaction with 
other local and macro environments. As the environment changes, a firm’s organization and  
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organizational structure may change as well. It is possible to create a vast number of small firms with 
distributed ownership by improving the supporting environment firms face, but it is hard to prescribe the 
optimal path of firm evolution beforehand. Competitive pressures are a way of eliminating less viable 
forms of organizational structures.  
Overall, both TVEs and clusters have provided an opportunity for many rural entrepreneurs to 
engage in nonfarm production. The success of China’s economic reform lies in the full use of individual 
talents, which are widely available among common people, and through introducing various institutional 




Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. 
Chang, Chun, and Yijiang Wang. 1994. The nature of the township-village enterprise. Journal of Comparative 
Economics 19 (3): 434–52. 
Che, Jiahua, and Yingyi Qian. 1998. Institutional environment, community government, and corporate governance: 
Understanding China’s township-village enterprises. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 14 (1): 
1–23. 
Chen, Xingming. 1996. Annals of Puyuan Township (Puyuan Xianzhi).  
Chen, H., and S. Rozelle. 1999. Local leaders, managers, and the organization of township and village enterprises in 
China. Journal of Development Economics 60: 529–57. 
China Ministry of Agriculture, 1986. Chinese Agricultural Yearbook. Beijing: China Agricultural Press.  
China National Bureau of Statistics. Various years. China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistical Press.  
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. The nature of the firm. Economica 4 (16): 386–405. 
Fudenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin. 2008. Evolution, cooperation, and repeated games. Mimeo. Harvard University 
and IAS, Princeton.  
Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart. 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral 
integration. Journal of Political Economy 94 (4): 691-719. 
Guangdong Province Bureau of Statistics. Various years. Guangdong Province Statistical Yearbooks. Beijing: China 
Statistical Press.  
Hart, Oliver. 1995. Firms, contracts, and financial structure. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hessler, Peter. 2007. Boomtowns. National Geographic, June: 88-117.  
Holmström, Bengt and John Roberts. 2008.  The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 12 (4): 73-94. 
Huang, Zuhui, Xiaobo Zhang, and Yunwei Zhu. 2008. The role of clustering in rural industrialization: A case study 
of Wenzhou’s footwear industry. China Economic Review 19 (3): 409-420. 
Jiangsu Province Bureau of Statistics. Various years. Jiangsu Province Statistical Yearbooks. Beijing: China 
Statistical Press.  
Li, David D. 1996. A theory of ambiguous property rights in transition economies: The case of the Chinese non-state 
sector. Journal of Comparative Economics 23 (1): 1–19. 
Lin, Justin Y. 1992. Rural reforms and agricultural growth in China. American Economic Review 82 (1): 34–51. 
Long, Cheryl, and Xiaobo Zhang. 2008. The spatial patterns of Chinese industries, 1995–2004. Memo.  
McMillan, John & Whalley, John & Zhu, Lijing, 1989. "The Impact of China's Economic Reforms on Agricultural 
Productivity Growth," Journal of Political Economy, 97(4): 781-807. 
Mukherjee, Anit, and Xiaobo Zhang, 2007. Rural industrialization in China and India: Role of policies and 
institutions. World Development 35 (10): 1621–34.  
Oi, Jean C. 1999. Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform. Berkeley, CA: Univ. of 
California Press. 
Qian, Yingyi, and Chenggang Xu. 1993. Why China’s economic reforms differ: The M-form hierarchy and 
entry/expansion of the non-state sector. Economics of Transition 1 (2): 135–70. 
Ruan, Jianqing, and Xiaobo Zhang. 2008. Credit constraints, organizational choice, and returns to capital. IFPRI 
discussion paper no. 830.   
22 
 
Ruan, Jianqing, and Xiaobo Zhang. 2009. Finance and cluster-based industrial development in China. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change. Forthcoming. 
Township and Village Enterprises Services, Ministry of Agriculture (TVES/MOA). 2003. China Township and 
Village Enterprises Statistical Materials, 1978–2002. Beijing: China Agricultural Press. 
Tsai, Kellee S. 2002. Back-alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Weitzman, Martin L., and Chenggang Xu. 1994. “Chinese township village enterprises as vaguely defined 
cooperatives.” Journal of Comparative Economics 18 (2,): 121-145. 
Williamson, Oliver. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: The Free 
Press.   
Xu, Chenggang. 1995. A different transition path: Ownership, performance, and influence of Chinese rural 
industrial enterprises. New York and London: Garland. 
Xu, Chenggang. 2008. The institutional foundations of China’s reforms and development. Working paper, 
University of Hong Kong.  
Zhang, Xiaobo. 2007. Asymmetric property rights in China’s economic growth. William Mitchell Law Review 33 
(2): 101–16. 
Zhejiang Province Bureau of Statistics. Various years. Zhejiang Province Statistical Yearbooks. Beijing: China 
Statistical Press.  
Zhu, Kangdui. 2007. Local government freedom of choice in privatization and market-oriented reform: Private and 
government interaction perspectives on the history of Wenzhou model. Memo, Wenzhou Public 





RECENT IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS 
For earlier discussion papers, please go to www.ifpri.org/pubs/pubs.htm#dp. 
All discussion papers can be downloaded free of charge. 
853.  Evaluating the impact of land tenure and titling on access to credit in Uganda. Carly K. Petracco and John Pender, 2009. 
852.  Participation by Men and Women in Off-Farm Activities: An Empirical Analysis in Rural Northern Ghana. Nancy 
McCarthy and Yan Sun, 2009. 
851.  Measuring agricultural innovation system properties and performance: Illustrations from Ethiopia and Vietnam. David J. 
Spielman and Dawit Kelemework, 2009. 
850.  Are returns to mothers’ human capital realized in the next generation?: The impact of mothers’ intellectual human 
capital and long-run nutritional status on children’s human capital in Guatemala. Jere R. Behrman, Alexis Murphy, 
Agnes R. Quisumbing, and Kathryn Yount, 2009. 
849.  Understanding Farmers' Perceptions and Adaptations to Climate Change and Variability: The Case of the Limpopo 
Basin, South Africa. Glwadys Aymone Gbetibouo, 2009. 
848.  Agglomeration, migration, and regional growth: A CGE analysis for Uganda. Paul Dorosh and James Thurlow, 2009. 
847.  Biosafety decisions and perceived commercial risks: The role of GM-free private standards. Guillaume Gruère and 
Debdatta Sengupta, 2009. 
846.  Impact of soaring food price in Ethiopia: does location matter? John M. Ulimwenju, Sindu Workneh, and Zelekawork 
Paulos, 2009. 
845.  Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement. Miguel Robles, 2009. 
844.  Agricultural strategy development in West Africa: The false promise of participation? Danielle Resnick and Regina 
Birner, 2008. 
843.  Climate variability and maize yield in South Africa: Results from GME and MELE methods. Wisdom Akpalu, Rashid M. 
Hassan, and Claudia Ringler, 2008. 
842.  Local impacts of a global crisis: Food price transmission and poverty impacts in Ghana. Godsway Cudjoe, Clemens 
Breisinger, and Xinshen Diao, 2008. 
841.  Technology transfer, policies, and the role of the private sector in the global poultry revolution. Clare A. Narrod, Carl E. 
Pray, and Marites Tiongco, 2008. 
840.  The impact of agricultural extension and roads on poverty and consumption growth in fifteen Ethiopian villages. Stefan 
Dercon, Daniel O. Gilligan, John Hoddinott, and Tassew Woldehanna, 2008. 
839.  The impact of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme and its linkages. Daniel O. Gilligan, John Hoddinott, and 
Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, 2008. 
838.  Aid effectiveness and capacity development: Implications for economic growth in developing countries. Prabuddha Sanyal 
and Suresh Babu, 2008. 
837.  A two-dimensional measure of polarization. Tewodaj Mogues, 2008. 
836.  Higher fuel and food prices: Economic impacts and responses for Mozambique. Channing Arndt, Rui Benfica, Nelson 
Maximiano, Antonio M.D. Nucifora, and James T. Thurlow, 2008 
835.  Accelerating innovation with prize rewards: History and typology of technology prizes and a new contest design for 
innovation in African agriculture. William A. Masters and Benoit Delbecq, 2008. 
834.  Local politics, political institutions, and public resource allocation. Nethra Palaniswamy and Nandini Krishnan, 2008. 
833.  Trade protection and tax evasion: Evidence from Kenya, Mauritius, and Nigeria. Antoine Bouet and Devesh Roy, 2008. 
832.  Global carbon markets: Are there opportunities for Sub-Saharan Africa? Elizabeth Bryan, Wisdom Akpalu, Mahmud 
Yesuf, and Claudia Ringler, 2008. 
831.  Anatomy of a crisis: The causes and consequences of surging food prices. Derek Heady and Shenggen Fan, 2008  
 




2033 K Street, NW 




IFPRI ADDIS ABABA 
P. O. Box 5689 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Tel.: +251 11 6463215 
Fax: +251 11 6462927 
Email: ifpri-addisababa@cgiar.org 
IFPRI NEW DELHI 
CG Block, NASC Complex, PUSA 
New Delhi 110-012 India 
Tel.: 91 11 2584-6565 
Fax: 91 11 2584-8008 / 2584-6572 
Email: ifpri-newdelhi@cgiar.org 